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ABSTRACT

The traditional failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is a conceptual design
methodology for dealing with potential failures. FMEA uses the risk priority number
(RPN), which is the product of three ranked factors to prioritize risks of different failure
modes. The three factors are occurrence, severity, and detection. However, the RPN may
not be able to provide consistent evaluation of risks for the following reasons: the RPN
has a high degree of subjectivity, it is difficult to compare different RPNs, and possible
failures may be overlooked in the traditional FMEA method.
The objective of this research is to develop a new FMEA methodology that can
overcome the aforementioned drawbacks. The expected cost is adopted to evaluate risks.
This will not only reduce the subjectivity in RPNs, but also provide a consistent basis for
risk analysis. In addition, the cause-effect chain structures are used in the new
methodology. Such structures are constructed based upon failure scenarios, which can
include all possible end effects (failures) given a root cause. Consequently, the results of
the risk analysis will be more reliable and accurate.
In the new methodology, the occurrence and severity ratings are replaced by
expected costs. The detection rating is reflected in failure scenarios by the probabilities of
either successful or unsuccessful detections of causes or effects. This treatment makes the
new methodology more realistic. The new methodology also uses interval variables to
accommodate uncertainties due to insufficient data.
The new methodology is evaluated and applied to a hydrokinetic turbine system.
This turbine is horizontal axis turbine, and it is under development at Missouri S&T.
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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. OVERVIEW OF FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is an engineering technique using
risk priority number (RPN) to prioritize failure modes. RPN is the product of three
ranked ratings, occurrence, severity and detection. It is calculated as RPN  O  S  D .
Occurrence (O) rating is assigned to the cause of the failure mode to reflect the
probability of the cause and the immediate failure mode, severity (S) rating is assigned to
the end effect of the failure mode to reflect the seriousness of the end effect, and
detection rating (D) is assigned to the cause of the failure mode to reflect the difficulty of
detecting the cause or failure mode. These ratings are quantified by integer numbers
between 1 and 10. RPNs are compared with each other, and failure modes with higher
RPNs are considered to have higher risk, and corrective actions are taken to reduce their
RPNs. In this way the system reliability is improved.
FMEA was firstly used by contractors for NASA in early 1960s. In 1967, civil
aviation industry started to use FMEA and related techniques [1], and a standard for
performing FMEA was published. The use of FMEA in automotive industry began from
mid 1970s [2]. It was adopted by the Ford Motor Company for safety and regulatory
consideration. And Toyota conducted the FMEA technique on the catalytic converter
which was used in the 1975 Toyota models. Critical failure modes to the durability of the
catalytic converter and their risks were studied and prioritized in this case study. Since
then, the implementation of FMEA started to spread all over industry.
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A bank performed process FMEA on its ATM system [3], and according to the
RPNs, “machine jams” and “heavy computer network traffic” were considered to have
the first and second highest risks, so that they could be treated with priority.
In [4], FMEA was performed on salmon processing. Fish receiving,
casing/marking, blood removal, evisceration, filet-making cooling/freezing, and
distribution were identified as the processes with the highest RPN values. After
corrective actions were taken, a second calculation of RPN values was carried out
resulting in substantially lower values.
FMEA was conducted on the study of wafer biscuit production lines in a food
company. It was used as a tool to assure products quality and as a mean to improve
operational performance of the production cycle. [5]
However, despite the wide implementation of FMEA in industry, controversies
have always been around. For example, the criteria for quantifying the three ratings are
mostly subjective, and they are described qualitatively in natural language based upon the
experience of teams; completely different combinations of O, S, and D can produce
identical values of RPN when they may indicate totally different risks. RPNs are not
evenly distributed from 1 to 1000, many “holes” exist in the distribution, and actually
only 120 values exist among the range, the mean of which are far from the mean of the
interval. O, S, and D are considered to be equally important in the calculation of RPN. In
fact the weight of one factor may be different from the other two.
Numerous FMEA approaches have been made to overcome the shortcomings
mentioned above, among which the fuzzy logic approach is one of the most popular
approaches.
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The O, S, and D ratings are all described in linguistic terms, and somewhat
subjective and imprecise. Fuzzy mathematics was considered to be a promising tool for
directly manipulating such linguistic terms in order to analyze risks associated with
failure modes [6-9].
The methodology of the fuzzy RPNs was proposed in [10]. The O, S and D
ratings are fuzzified and evaluated in a fuzzy inference system built on a consistent base
of IF-THEN rules. Then the fuzzy output is defuzzified so that the crisp value of the RPN
can be obtained and used for a more accurate ranking of the potential risks. It shows that
in this method exactly same RPN can only be generated with exactly same O, S and D
ratings.
Gargama and Chaturvedi proposed two methods in [11]. One of them computes
fuzzy RPNs by fuzzy extension principle. This method scores O, S, D ratings
linguistically for each failure mode and translate them into fuzzy numbers. The RPN is
calculated by fuzzy arithmetic as a fuzzy number as well. These fuzzy RPNs are then
defuzzified using the centroid method and ranked in a descending order.
Similar fuzzy logic approaches can be found in [12-16] and so on. All of these
papers follow the general approach when utilizing fuzzy logic, and what distinguishes
them is normally the application area or the specifics of fuzzy inference system.
Beside the aforementioned approaches which are aimed at overcoming drawbacks
of RPNs, some other modified methods have been proposed too.
In [17], Bevilacqua et al. proposed a modified method which uses a special RPN
composed of a weighted sum of six parameters to evaluate risks, and conducted Monte
Carlo simulation to randomly generated several sets of possible weights. Ashen proposed
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a cost-oriented approach to improve the method of FMEA from an economic perspective
in [18], which considers the failure costs associated with both externally detected faults
and internally detected faults to fully cover a financial risk assessment. In [19], artificial
neural networks were used by Seo, and the life cycle cost of a product during conceptual
design was approximated by implementing the networks. A model for estimating
reliability life cycle costs was proposed by Jiang [20]. However, this method is mainly
applied to remanufactured products instead of new products. In [21], a robust design
method, which includes the effects of uncertainty while evaluating the economic benefits
of design changes, was proposed by Roser.
Other approaches aimed at better representation of failures were made by many
researchers as well. For example, in [22], Lee proposed employing Bayes probabilistic
networks which trace causal chains and their probabilities. The method can not only
enhance the way failure is represented in the traditional FMEA but also increase the
accuracy of risk analysis. He and Adamyan [23] proposed an approach which combined
FMEA and Petri nets to analyze multiple failure effects and their impacts on reliability
and quality of product and process design. These approaches provide reliable failure
representation and probability estimates, but they do not incorporate cost into the risk
prioritization.
Using the expected cost to prioritize risks has proven its validity and objectivity.
It was firstly brought up in [24] and has been adopted by many researchers.
Rhee proposed an approach, called life cost-based FMEA with Monte Carlo
simulation in [25]. This approach evaluated risk in terms of life cycle cost, which was
measured by the loss time. Monte Carlo simulations were applied to the analysis to take
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the uncertainty of parameters. In Rhee’s another approach [26], a systematic use of
empirical data for applying life cost-based FMEA was proposed. According to this
approach, information such as availability of system, down time of system, failure
frequency, and loss time can all be derived from empirical data. And Monte Carlo
simulation needs to be applied as well to account for uncertainty of parameters.
In [27] and [28], Kmenta proposed an approach named scenario-based FMEA.
The author explained why the result of the risk analysis could be more reliable if FMEA
was organized around failure scenario instead of failure mode and how the analysis
process could be facilitated. The rationality behind failure scenarios are discussed too.
The expected cost was then proposed to be adopted as the tool to evaluate risks. And
detailed comparison between expected cost and RPN were given in their work.
However, in Kmenta’s work, detection ratings were assumed to be constant, the
rationality behind which needs to be examined. In the approach presented in this thesis,
besides the adoption of the expected cost as a tool to evaluate risks, cause-effect chain
structures are used too. Such structure is constructed based upon failure scenarios with an
identical root cause. Moreover, unlike the approach proposed by Kmenta, detection is
included in the structure and contributes to risk evaluation too.
All of the above approaches provide insight into how the traditional FMEA can be
improved by various ways. But it is still difficult to address the following issues: the
degree of subjectivity in RPNs is significant, comparison of risk information provided by
RPNs is difficult and a comprehensive and realistic consideration of possible end effects
is still hard.
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This research is motivated by the needs to prioritize risks with higher objectivity
and accuracy and facilitate comparison of risks between products or processes.

1.2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
In this work, a new FMEA approach is proposed to improve the traditional FMEA
method so that failure risk can be prioritized more objectively and precisely, and
comparison of risks between products or processes across all system levels can be easily
facilitated.
To accomplish this objective, the expected cost is utilized in this method to
evaluate risks. The expected cost is a universal measurement of risks, and it can be
obtained in a much more objective way. This reduces subjectivity in the results to
minimum. And by using the expected cost, the results of risk analysis from different
system levels can be compared easily. Moreover, with the inclusion of cost as an
evaluating factor, it gives the opportunity to balance the costs of corrective actions with
expected revenues. This allows an optimized resource allocation and economical
evaluation of changes.
What’s more, the cause-effect chain structures which are based upon failure
scenarios are employed in the new methodology as well. Failure scenario can take all
possible end effects into consideration, and so such a cause-effect chain structure can
provide a much more reliable and accurate result of risk analysis. At the meantime, by
constructing such structures, the calculation of expected cost becomes quite
straightforward.
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In the new methodology, the occurrence and severity ratings are replaced by the
expected costs. The detection rating is reflected in failure scenarios by the probabilities of
either successful or unsuccessful detections of causes or effects. This treatment makes the
new methodology more realistic.
This method overcomes the aforementioned drawbacks and proves its advantages
over the traditional FMEA. The results obtained by this method are more objective and
accurate, and they can be compared with each other across all system levels. Moreover,
decision making can be based on the balance between the costs of corrective actions and
expected revenues.

1.3. THESIS OUTLINE
In Section 2, the methodology and limitations of the traditional FMEA are
discussed first. Then an extensive review on different approaches that have been made to
improve the traditional FMEA and hydrokinetic energy conversion systems is conducted,
followed by the background introduction of a hydrokinetic system being developed at
Missouri S&T.
In Section 3, the objective of the proposed FMEA approach is introduced first.
Then the overview and implementation of the method are illustrated, including all the
major components of the method and steps that should be carried out when applying the
method. Last, a simple example is used to demonstrate how to apply the method to a
problem in reality.
Section 4 mainly consists of application of the proposed method to a hydrokinetic
system. The process of the application is illustrated from the first step. Two case studies
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are then carried out in this section in order to compare the results and prioritize the one
with higher risk.
Section 5 contains the conclusions drawn from the application of the method in
Section 4 and some insight into future work. A general introduction to the methodology
of the new method is presented in this section first. Then the advantages of the new
method over the traditional FMEA are discussed. Future work that can be done to
improve the new method is proposed in this section too.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. INTRODUCTION TO TRADITIONAL FMEA
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is one of the widely-used
engineering analysis techniques. It is performed to identify, prioritize and eliminate
known and potential failures, problems and errors in systems, products or processes
before they reach customers [29]. It provides a systematic method of examining all the
possible ways in which a failure could occur.
The FMEA is performed in several steps. The first step is describing the product
or process on which FMEA is conducted. Then functions of the product or process are
defined so that potential failure modes could be identified. Once all possible failure
modes are obtained, occurrence rating is assigned to the cause of the failure mode to
reflect the probability of the cause and the immediate failure mode, severity rating is
assigned to the end effect of the failure mode to reflect the seriousness of the end effect,
and detection rating is assigned to the cause of the failure mode to reflect the difficulty of
detecting the cause or failure mode. All of the three ratings are quantified by integer
values ranging from 1 to 10 and then multiplied together to obtain the risk priority
number (RPN), which is used to determine the risk priority of a failure mode.
Failure modes with higher RPNs are considered to have higher risk of
malfunction during operation so that corrective actions are taken to reduce the RPNs of
these failure modes prior to others. If the RPNs are not reduced as expected, new
corrective actions will be designed until the purpose is satisfied. The flowchart describing
FMEA procedure is shown in Figure 2.1.
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Describe product or process

Define functions of the product or process

Identify potential failure modes

Describe effects of failure modes (severity ratings)

Determine causes of failure modes (occurrence ratings)

Describe detection methods (detection ratings)

Calculate risk priority numbers (RPNs)

Design corrective plan of actions

Figure 2.1. Flowchart Describing the Procedure of FMEA
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As aforementioned, risk priority number (RPN) is used in FMEA to prioritize
failure modes. It is calculated by the following equation.

RPN  O  S  D

(1)

In Equation (1), O stands for occurrence rating, S stands for severity rating and D
stands for detection rating. All of the three ratings are quantified by integer values
ranging from 1 to 10. Details of the three ratings are provided in Table 2.1 through
Table 2.3.

Table 2.1. Ratings for Occurrence [30]
Rank

Probability of occurrence

Failure probability

10

Extremely high: failure almost inevitable

>1 in 2

9

Very high

1 in 3

8

Repeated failures

1 in 8

7

High

1 in 20

6

Moderately high

1 in 80

5

Moderate

1 in 400

4

Relatively low

1 in 2000

3

Low

1 in 15000

2

Remote

1 in 150000

1

Nearly impossible

<1 in 1500000
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Table 2.2. Ratings for Severity [30]
Rank Effect

Severity of effect

10

Failure is hazardous, and occurs without warning. It suspends

Hazardous

operation of the system and/or involves noncompliance with
government regulations.
9

Serious

Failure involves hazardous outcomes and/or noncompliance with
government regulations or standards.

8

Extreme

Product is inoperable with loss of primary function. The system is
inoperable.

7

Major

Product performance is severely affected but functions. The system
may not operate.

6

Significant

Product performance is degraded. Comfort or convince functions
may not operate.

5

Moderate

Moderate effect on product performance. The product requires
repair.

4

Low

Small effect on product performance. The product does not require
repair.

3

Minor

Minor effect on product or system performance.

2

Very

Very minor effect on product or system performance.

minor
1

None

No effect.
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Table 2.3. Ratings for Detection [30]
Rank Detection

Likelihood of detection by design control

10

Absolute

Design Control will not and/or cannot detect a potential

uncertainty

cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode; or there is no
Design Control.

9

Very remote

Very remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.

8

Remote

Remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.

7

Very low

Very low chance the Design Control will detect a potential
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.

6

Low

Low chance the Design Control will detect a potential
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode

5

Moderate

Moderate chance the Design Control will detect a potential
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.

4

3

Moderately

Moderately high chance the Design Control will detect a

high

potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.

High

High chance the Design Control will detect a potential
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.

2

Very high

Very high chance the Design Control will detect a potential
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.

1

Almost certain

Design Control will almost certainly detect a potential
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.

14

A good FMEA table satisfies the following requirements:


Identifying known and potential failure modes



Identifying the causes and effects of each failure mode



Prioritizing the identified failure modes according to the risk priority number
(RPN)



Providing corrective actions
A typical FMEA table is given in Table 2.4.
Because FMEA is easy to use and understand, it’s been widely adopted since last

century. FMEA was firstly used by contractors for NASA in early 1960s, then it began to
be adopted by industry too. In 1967, civil aviation industry started to use FMEA and
related techniques [1], and a standard for performing FMEA was published. The use of
FMEA in automotive industry began from mid 1970s [2]. It was adopted by the Ford
Motor Company for safety and regulatory consideration. And Toyota conducted the
FMEA technique on the catalytic converter which was used in the 1975 Toyota models.
Critical failure modes to the durability of the catalytic converter and their risks were
studied and prioritized through this case study. Since then, the implementation of FMEA
started to spread all over industry.
A bank performed process FMEA on its ATM system [3]. According to the RPNs,
“machine jams” and “heavy computer network traffic” were considered to have the first
and second highest risks.
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Table 2.4. A Typical FMEA Table
Product
Failure

Failure

or

Actions/
S

Mode

Causes O

Controls

D

RPN

Effect

Plans

Process

Determine

Determine

Determine

product or

effects of

causes of

process

Determine

the failure

the failure

functions

failure

mode;

mode;

modes of

Severity

Occurrence

functions

rating

rating

Determine
controls;

O*S*D

Detection
rating

Develop
improvement
plans

In [4], FMEA was performed on salmon processing. Fish receiving,
casing/marking, blood removal, evisceration, filet-making cooling/freezing, and
distribution were identified as the processes with the highest RPN values. After
corrective actions were taken, a second calculation of RPN values was carried out
resulting in substantially lower values.
However, despite the contribution the traditional FMEA has made to industry all
over the world, its shortcomings have never been ignored and have been criticized for
many reasons. In next section, more details about the limitations of the traditional FMEA
will be discussed.
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2.2. LIMITATIONS OF TRADITIONAL FMEA
As previously mentioned, the traditional FMEA has proved to be one of the most
important early failure-preventive engineering techniques. However, many issues still
need to be addressed for further enhancement of this method.
The most criticized shortcoming of FMEA is the determination methodology
utilized in producing RPNs. As is known now, RPN is the key factor in FMEA. It is the
ultimate tool used by FMEA to evaluate the risk of failure modes. However, as the
product of three integer values, O (occurrence), S (severity) and D (detection), the
validity and rationality of RPN and the result it yields are always questioned for the
following reasons:


Completely different combinations of O, S, and D can produce identical value of
RPN when they can be meaning totally different risks. For example, two different
events with the O, S and D ratings of 8, 5, 2 and 2, 4, 10 have the same RPN
values while they represent totally different risks.



RPNs are not evenly distributed from 1 to 1000, which is shown in Table 2.5.
Many “holes” exist in the distribution. This introduces much difficulty in
interpreting the meaning of the differences between different RPNs. For example,
does the difference between RPNs 1 and 2 have the same meaning as the
difference between 900 and 1000?



O, S, and D are considered to be equally important in the calculation of RPN,
which may not be true from the perspective of many practitioners, who believe
that S (severity) is the most important factor.
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Table 2.5. RPN Scale Characteristics [31]



Interval

No. of values

%

1-200

67

55.8

201-400

26

21.7

401-600

17

14.2

601-800

7

5.8

801-1000

3

2.5

O, S, and D are converted differently. The conversion of O may follow a linear
fashion while that of D doesn’t. For example, O (occurrence) value of 1 and 2
may represent the occurrence probability of 0.1 and 0.2, respectively, following a
linear function, Y=10*X. But detection value cannot be converted in this way.



Due to the determination methodology of RPN, small variation in one of the O, S,
and D ratings can generate vastly different RPNs. For example, if O and S are
both 10, and D is 1 or 2, the RPNs are 100 and 200 respectively. Although the
detection rating is only changed by 1, the change of RPN is 100.



The three risk factors are difficult to be quantified precisely and objectively,
because the O, S, and D values are often quantified based on the experience of the
team members who conduct the analysis, which means different evaluation results
can be obtained when the same failure mode is analyzed by different FMEA
teams. So the RPN is considered to be of high degree of subjectivity when

18

estimating the values of the three factors, especially the values of S (severity) and
D (detection).
For these reasons, it is concluded that RPNs used in the traditional FMEA may
not offer a consistent evaluation of risks. In another word, the RPN is seriously limited in
terms of its ability to compare, scale and integrate risk information[28]. Considering this,
researchers have made many different approaches to improve the traditional FMEA
method, which will be discussed in next section.

2.3. IMPROVEMENTS ON TRADITIONAL FMEA
As discussed above, the result of the traditional FMEA method, RPNs, may not be
able to offer a consistent evaluation of risks. Moreover, the irrationality and subjectivity
of RPNs are criticized too. For the purpose of making FMEA a more reliable tool to
conduct risk prioritization, numerous approaches have been made by far. One of the most
popular approaches proposed to improve the traditional FMEA is to include other factors
such as costs in the risk evaluation process.
The purpose of performing FMEA is to identify and determine the risk priorities
of failure modes so that appropriate corrective actions can be taken to prevent potential
failures from happening. As is known, risk contains two basic elements: chance and
consequence. Chance is easy to understand, which may represent possibility, uncertainty
or probability. Meanwhile, consequence often means cost, injury or hazard, so cost can
properly serve as an accepted measure of consequences. Moreover, it is also an objective
means to evaluate the real effects of failures, which makes it a legitimate factor that can
be included to evaluate risks and reduce subjectivity as well. Also, with the inclusion of
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cost as an evaluating factor, it gives the opportunity to balance the costs of corrective
actions with expected revenues, allowing an optimized resource allocation and evaluation
of changes [31].
Ashen proposed a cost-oriented approach to improve the method of FMEA from
an economic perspective in [18], which considers the failure costs associated with both
externally detected faults and internally detected faults to fully cover a financial risk
assessment. A case study using the new method with an automotive supplier, proved it to
be more advantageous than conventional FMEA. However, comprehensive and accurate
information on the cost of failures is required to implement this approach.
Rhee proposed an approach, called life cost-based FMEA with Monte Carlo
simulation in [25]. This approach evaluated risk in terms of life cycle cost, which was
measured by loss time. Monte Carlo simulations were applied to the analysis to take the
uncertainty of parameters, such as detection time, delay time and fix time into
consideration instead of using point estimation of those parameters. This method showed
its advantage over RPN and life cost-based point estimation by enabling designers pick
the best design in terms of cost.
In Rhee’s another approach [26], a systematic use of empirical data for applying
life cost-based FMEA was proposed. According to this approach, availability of the
system can be derived from empirical data, by which downtime and failure frequency can
both be obtained. In addition, with the use of empirical data, loss time can be estimated
too, by which failure cost can be acquired. And this approach applies Monte Carlo
simulation to the analysis to account for the uncertainty of parameters aforementioned as
well.
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In [32], Rhee applied the proposed method to a linear particle collider. The
concept “expected cost” was adopted, and the two components of expected cost,
probability of failure and failure cost, were analyzed more precisely in this work. The
author used empirical data to obtain the probability of failure so that the uncertainty and
subjectivity which were introduced by estimation could be minimized. Furthermore, in
this work the author also provided the break-down of the failure cost, which included
labor cost, material cost and opportunity cost as well. It proved that this approach helped
engineers with not only design improvements but also concept selection. This overcomes
the drawback of the traditional FMEA, which does not consider both risk and lifecycle
cost during concept selection. However, the author also admitted the difficulty of
extracting useful empirical data efficiently, since a huge amount of irrelevant data existed.
Using expected cost to prioritize risks has proven its validity and necessity and
has been adopted by many researchers since firstly brought up by [24]. But there is still
space for improvement. Another approach which was proposed from a different angle
follows next.
As known, the traditional FMEA is basically an analysis technique organized
around failure modes, the description of which can be easily mistaken with failure causes
and failure effects sometimes. Failure modes can be as simple as negative statements of
function, but when engineers try to describe a failure mode, they often focus on the
description of what went wrong, which leads to a statement describing an effect or a
cause rather than a failure mode [33].
However, the term failure mode can be less confusing and the process of risk
analysis can be facilitated if a failure scenario is generated beforehand, because in a
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failure scenario, the failure mode becomes an arbitrary link. In this way, if the failure
mode has a cause, and the cause also has its own cause, they will all be added together in
the form of a chain; similarly, if the failure mode has a subsequent effect, and this effect
has its own subsequent effect, they can also be added to the chain too. So this causeeffect chain can be lengthened whenever new causes and effects are identified. In this
way, the simple chain composed of causes and effects now represents a failure scenario.
It can be foreseen that risk analysis based on failure scenarios will provide much more
reliable and accurate results than the analysis based on a traditional FMEA table, since
the possibilities of all kinds of failures given a root cause are all under consideration in
failure scenarios while in a traditional FMEA table only the most serious effect is
considered.
In sum, the necessity of constructing such failure scenarios lies in the fact that a
traditional FMEA table always overlooks different failures that might happen. Take the
occurrence of oil leak in a car engine for instance. Suppose oil leak has an effect, for
example, engine malfunction. In a traditional FMEA table, such as Figure 2.1, a simple
chain will be constructed with occurrence rating assigned to the cause, severity rating
assigned to the engine malfunction and detection rating assigned to the detection
difficulty of oil leak before engine malfunction is realized. After that, the three ratings are
multiplied together to obtain the RPN of this failure mode. Then the risk priority is
determined by the RPN. It is not reasonable to completely deny the reliability of this
result. However, if a failure scenario rather than a failure mode is considered in this case,
totally different results can be obtained. The failure scenarios constructed for this case are
shown in Figure 2.2.
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Oil leak

Warning lights

Signal detected

Oil leak

Warning lights

Signal undetected

Operation ceased

Operation continues

Engine malfunction

Oil leak

No warning lights

Operation continues

Engine malfunction

Figure 2.2. An Example of Failure Scenarios [27]

It can be seen from the figure that unlike a traditional FMEA table, three chains
instead of only one are constructed. Each of the cause-effect chains represents an
individual failure scenario, so the risk analysis should be conducted in every chain now,
which implies the possibility that a more reliable result of risk evaluation could be
obtained. Moreover, by constructing such chains, “operation ceased” as a new end effect
or failure in addition to “engine malfunction” is identified.
In [27], the idea of scenario-based FMEA was first brought up by Kmenta. The
author explained why the result of risk analysis could be more reliable if FMEA was
organized around failure scenario instead of failure mode. Moreover, the expected cost
was proposed to be adopted as the tool to evaluate risks. The advantages of expected cost
over RPN were discussed too. But only cursory explanation was given in this work. In
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[28], more details were given on the advantages of failure scenario over failure mode and
the rationality behind failure scenarios. In addition, detailed comparison between the
RPN and expected cost was given in this work too.
Many different approaches have been made to improve FMEA. And some of
them proved to be applicable in eliminating the shortcomings of the traditional FMEA,
but some still need to be further examined. In this work, a modified approach based on
Kmenta’s method and the idea of Bayesian network FMEA [22] is made. And it is
applied to a hydrokinetic energy conversion system being developed at Missouri S&T.

2.4. HYDROKINETIC ENERGY CONVERSION SYSTEMS
Hydrokinetic energy is an emerging field of renewable energy. Compared to
hydroelectric energy, which is the most widely used renewable energy around the world,
hydrokinetic energy is still in the developmental phase.
Hydrokinetic energy is described as the energy that can be generated from
flowing water in rivers or oceans. Unlike the conventional hydropower generation,
hydrokinetic energy is generated by extracting kinetic energy from flowing water rather
than potential energy from falling water [34].
An illustration of the hydrokinetic turbine blades and transmission shaft assembly
is shown in Figure 2.3.
In a typical hydrokinetic turbine, the rotor of the hydrokinetic turbine is immersed
in the river or ocean. The kinetic energy of flowing water is then harnessed by the system
to rotate the rotor blades. Through the transmission shaft and gear box, the energy is then
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transmitted to a generator that is coupled to the rotor. As long as the rotor blades are
rotated by the flowing water, the generator will generate electric power continuously.

Shaft Housing
Bearing

Bevel Gear Assembly
Transmission Shaft

Turbine Blade

Figure 2.3. Assembly of Hydrokinetic Turbine Blades [35]

Hydrokinetic systems have many advantages over other hydropower systems.
Since a hydrokinetic turbine harnesses the kinetic energy of flowing water instead of
potential energy of water fall, it doesn’t require the construction of dams or reservoirs,
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which saves a lot of work and labor cost and incurs very little impact on environment, so
it is much more environment-friendly compared with other power sources [36, 37].
Moreover, a hydrokinetic turbine system is usually smaller in size compared with solar or
wind energy system, which makes it easier to be moved and reallocated. Therefore, it is
more adapted to the natural environment change. The initial cost of a hydrokinetic turbine
is relatively small too [38, 39].
By studying the process of energy generation from other fields, such as tidal
energy, marine current energy and most importantly wind energy, a good understanding
of how hydrokinetic energy conversion system works can be obtained, because they
basically work on the same principle. The kinetic energy of the streaming fluid is utilized
to rotate an electromechanical energy converter and subsequently generate electricity. [40]
Currently, turbine systems, which are conceived as major choices for the
conversion of hydrokinetic energy, generally fall into three categories: horizontal axis,
vertical axis and cross flow turbines [41]. But the first two types, horizontal axis and
vertical axis turbines, however, are most widely used.
2.4.1. Horizontal Axis Hydrokinetic Turbine. Horizontal axis turbines usually
have axes parallel to the incoming water flow. The kinetic energy of the flowing water
will rotate the turbine blades and then electric power will be generated continuously.
Various arrangements of axial turbines including inclined axis turbines and straight axis
turbines can be found in Figure 2.4. Generally speaking, an inclined axis turbine is
mostly considered to be used for small river energy conversion, while straight axis
turbines are the prime choices for tidal energy conversion.
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Inclined Axis

Non-submerged Generator

Rigid mooring

Submerged Generator

Figure 2.4. Types of Horizontal Axis Hydrokinetic Turbine [41]
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2.4.2. Vertical Axis Hydrokinetic Turbine. In the vertical axis domain, various
arrangements of turbines are shown in Figure 2.5. Darrieus turbines are the prominent
choices for vertical axis turbines, especially the two straight bladed turbines in the figure.
The applications of them are quite common and easy to find, however, the use of
Darrieus turbines with curved or parabolic blades cannot be found yet. Gorlov and
Savonious turbines are shown in the figure too, which may consist of straight or skewed
blades.

Squirrel Cage Darrieus

Darrieus

H-Darrieus

Gorlov

Savonius

Figure 2.5. Types of Vertical Axis Hydrokinetic Turbine [41]
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2.4.3. Challenges and Prospects. Although the advantages of hydrokinetic are
obvious, the challenges it faces are significant too. Because the concept of hydrokinetic
energy is relatively new, not much work has been done towards the development of
hydrokinetic turbines and they are not widely deployed for commercial use yet. So data
regarding underwater installation, material issues, etc. is limited, which puts a lot of
obstructions on the way to develop a cost-effective hydrokinetic system.
However, the future of hydrokinetic system is still promising. Study shows that
the US rivers hydrokinetic power potential is estimated to be 12,500 MW per year [42].
As the electricity consumption around the globe increases every year, if hydrokinetic
energy is proved to be cost-effective, utilizing this promising power source will help
address the pending energy crisis the world faces [43].
In Section 2.5, a hydrokinetic system being developed at Missouri University of
Science and Technology will be introduced.

2.5. HYDROKINETIC TURBINE BEING DEVELOPED
The turbine developed in Mechanical Engineering Department at Missouri S&T is
a horizontal axis turbine shown in Figure 2.6.
According to [44] and [45], for wind turbine systems, failure modes of turbine
blades have the highest RPNs, and they should be given more consideration at the design
stage.
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Figure 2.6. Hydrokinetic Turbine at Missouri S&T

Since hydrokinetic turbine and wind turbine are similar from design and operation
point of view, and they basically work on the same principle, it is assumed that for
hydrokinetic systems, turbines blades are also have the failure modes with the highest
RPNs and priority should be given to them for corrective actions.
The turbine blades can be seen in Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8. The blades are made
from composite materials, because composite materials are lightweight, durable and
water resistant compared with metals. More importantly, composite materials make it
possible to embed sensors inside the blades during manufacturing process so that the
structure health can be monitored when the system is in operation.
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Figure 2.7. Front View of the Turbine Blades

Figure 2.8. Side View of the Turbine Blades
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Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8 show front and side view of the turbine blades of the
hydrokinetic system, respectively. Each of the three composite blades is about 0.3 m in
length and embedded with a fiber optic strain gage and acoustic transducer.
The fiber optic strain gage senses the degradation of the blade structure over time
due to cyclic loading and transient environmental factors. A power and electronics
module inside the blade conditions the fiber optic strain gage signal into an acoustic
signal that is transmitted by the acoustic transducer. The acoustic waves propagate
through the water to a receiver that is located near the shore or on the system foundation.
The received acoustic signal can then be broadcast above water long distances by radio
waves to the monitoring station. The broadcast signal can be interpreted at the monitoring
station, yielding real-time strain data from the blade [46].
The proposed modified FMEA approach will be applied to the turbine blades
introduced above, details of which will be given in Section 4.
In the next section, details on the motivation to propose the new method and how
it works will be discussed.

32

3. IMPROVED FMEA METHODOLOGY

3.1. OBJECTIVE OF THE NEW APPROACH
As discussed in previous chapter, although the traditional FMEA is a good tool
for preventing potential failures, the methodology has many drawbacks, especially the
way of determining the risk priority numbers.
The objective of this research is to develop a new FMEA approach to improve the
traditional FMEA method so that failure risks can be prioritized more objectively and
precisely in terms of cost.
In the new method, the expected cost instead of RPN is used to conduct risk
evaluation by the following equation.

Risk  Pf C

(2)

where Pf means the probability of failure, and C means the failure cost.
From the perspective of many engineers, risk contains two elements: 1) chance:
possibility, uncertainty, probability, etc., and 2) consequence: cost, hazard, injury, etc.
The chance describes the possibility of undesired event, and the consequence is intended
to quantify the loss caused by the failure. Since a probability is a universal measure of
chance and a cost is also a universal measure of consequence, the expected cost as the
product of failure probability and failure cost can serve as a legitimate way to evaluate
risk. In addition, the results obtained in this way can minimize subjectivity since the
probability of failure and failure cost can be usually obtained from available historical
data.
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From Equation, it is observed that expected cost is composed of two elements, the
probability of failure Pf and the failure cost C . If Pf and C both increase, the risk will
increase; if Pf and C both decrease, the risk will decrease; however, if Pf increases and
C decreases, or, Pf decreases and C increases, the change of risk cannot be determined.

Prior to any risk calculation, the cause-effect chain structures should be
constructed first. Such structures are constructed based upon failure scenarios [27] and
Bayes Belief Networks [22].
In a cause-effect chain structure, all possible end effects given a root cause are
under consideration, and this makes the results of risk analysis more reliable and accurate.
In addition, detections are included in the structure as well, which is unlike the approach
proposed by Kmenta in [28], where the probability of detection is assumed to be constant.
In this approach, the detection is included in the cause-effect chain structure and is
reflected as the probability of successful or unsuccessful detection when calculating the
probability of end effects. This makes the results more realistic.
By adopting expected cost and cause-effect chain structures, the new method
overcomes the drawbacks of the traditional FMEA in the following areas.


When calculating RPNs, there is no standard scale for the O (occurrence), S
(severity), and D (detection) ratings, and they vary based on scope, applications
and so on [28]. The ratings are not based upon strictly objective elements but
most on the experience of the team members who conduct the analysis, and so the
results yielded by RPNs are inevitably considered to be of high subjectivity.
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Since the magnitudes of RPNs are not meaningful, the comparison of RPNs
between different products or processes is difficult and sometimes impossible.
Different products or processes have different criteria based on which the O, S
and D ratings are quantified, so the failure mode of one product with higher RPN
does not necessarily have higher risk than the failure mode of another product.



Even within a single FMEA, comparison of RPNs is not straightforward, because
the traditional method is unable to represent the distance between each RPN
value. As known, RPN is the product of three ordinal values: O, S and D. Ordinal
values are often used to rank industries, such as quality of hotels, theaters and
restaurants etc. The magnitudes of RPNs are not meaningful, and they can only
represent the rank in a group of items [47]. So the distance between the values
cannot be measured, for example, if one RPN is twice another one, you can only
make an appropriate assumption that the failure mode with the higher RPN has
“higher” risk than the other failure mode. You cannot state that its risk is twice
that of the other one.



Furthermore, the traditional FMEA tends to overlook different end effects that
might actually happen, since in a traditional FMEA table, only the most serious
end effects of failure modes are considered and then severity ratings are assigned
to them. But in reality, when the cause of a failure mode happens, it is very likely
that other different end effects can happen too.
In the next section, an overview of the proposed methodology will be discussed.
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3.2. OVERVIEW OF THE NEW APPROACH
As discussed in Section 3.1, the cause-effect chain structures should be
constructed first to conduct the risk analysis. A cause-effect chain structure is mainly
based upon failure scenarios. Once given a root cause, this structure is expected to
include as many failure scenarios as possible to make the risk evaluation more accurate
and reliable. An example of the cause-effect chain structure for demonstration is shown
in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1. A Cause-Effect Chain Structure for Demonstration
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Each chain is composed of three basic elements: root cause CR , detection D and
effect E , which includes immediate effects, intermediate effects and end effects. The end
effect in each chain is often represented by failure cost C when calculating the risk in
terms of cost.
The subscription of symbols in such a structure is explained in Table 3.1 below.
There are six cause-effect chains in this structure. Since every chain can be interpreted in
a similar fashion, only the first two chains are used to explain the methodology of the
new FMEA approach.

Table 3.1. Meanings of Symbols in a Cause-Effect Chain Structure
Symbols

Meanings

CR

Root cause in a cause-effect chain structure

E

Effect of cause in a cause-effect chain structure

Eij

The j -th intermediate effect in the chain initiated by the i -th
immediate effect of root cause CR without unsuccessful
detection ahead

Eij

The j -th intermediate effect in the chain initiated by the i -th
immediate effect of root cause CR with one unsuccessful
detection ahead
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Table 3.1. Meanings of Symbols in the Cause-Effect Chain Structure (cont.)
Eij

The j -th intermediate effect in the chain initiated by the i -th
immediate effect of root cause CR with two unsuccessful
detections ahead

D

Detection implemented in a cause-effect structure

Dij

Successful detection of intermediate effect Eij

Dij

Unsuccessful detection of intermediate effect Eij

C

Failure cost of end effect in each failure scenario

Ci

The failure cost in the i -th chain of the structure

In the first chain, root cause CR has an immediate effect E11 . Detection is then
implemented to detect the occurrence of E11 . If it is detected, effect E12 happens. On the
other hand, if it goes undetected, another effect E12 happens. Then effect E12 is under
detection again, which yields two different end effects depending on whether it is
detected or not. E13 means the end effect if E12 is detected successfully, and it is
represented by failure cost C1 . E13 is the end effect if E12 is not detected at all, and it is
represented by failure cost C2 . It can be expected that C2 will be much larger than C1 .
Using the same method, FMEA teams will be able to construct different causeeffect structures for different root causes. Then the expected cost of every root cause will
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be compared with each other. The one with the highest expected cost will be the root
cause with the highest risk so that corrective actions can be taken prior to others.
It should be pointed out that the structure shown in Figure 3.1 is merely an
illustrative case used to demonstrate the methodology. The number of immediate effects,
intermediate effects and detections are all changeable. For example, root cause CR may
have one or more immediate effects in the structure above, while in the case above it has
two immediate effects, E11 and E21 . Similarly, one immediate effect may have one or
more subsequent effects too. The number of detections in a cause-effect chain is also
changeable. For example, D11 and D12 are implemented in the first cause-effect chain,
but under certain circumstances it might be impossible to identify the occurrence of effect

E12 . This means that D12 will not exist any longer. On the other hand, there might be
more detections along the chain too, for example, D13 .
In sum, different root causes can have totally different cause–effect structures.
However, the routine of constructing such a structure is universal. One just needs to
examine from root cause to end effects and identify every intermediate effect E and
detection technique in between.

3.3. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW APPROACH
Once a complete chain structure is constructed, the next step is collecting
information from historical data or other sources to calculate the risk of root causes.
Sometimes it can be extremely difficult to acquire useful information. If this happens,
making appropriate assumptions is acceptable.
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Equation (2) indicates that in order to calculate the risk, the probability of failure

Pf and failure cost C should be obtained first.
To acquire the probability of failure, information such as the occurrence
probability of root cause CR , conditional probability of immediate effect and
intermediate effect E are needed.
According to the theory of conditional probability, for two events A and B with
P( A) > 0, the conditional probability for B given A is

P( B A) 

P( A B)
P( A)

(3)

where A B means events A and B both happen, and P( A B) means the joint
probability of A and B.
The equation above can be also written as
P( A B)  P( B A) P( A)

(4)

It means that the probability of event A and B happening at the same time is the
product of the conditional probability of event B given A and the occurrence probability
of event A.
Moreover, considering another event C, the conditional probability of which
given the occurrence of A and B is given as

P(C A B) 

P( A B C )
P( A B)

(5)
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Equation (4) can be written as
P( A B C )  P(C A B) P( A B)

(6)

By the theory provided by Equation (4) and (6), once occurrence probability of
root cause CR , conditional probability of immediate effect and intermediate effect E are
all obtained, the probability of failure can be calculated easily. Moreover, a cause-effect
chain structure makes the calculation straightforward.
The failure cost can usually be acquired by historical data. After all the
information is collected, the risk of root cause R(CR ) can be now calculated.
For the structure in Figure 3.1, the equations that calculate the risk of root cause

CR are shown below. There exist six paths in the structure, each path is evaluated
individually then all the results are added together to represent the total risk of root cause.
For path 1: CR  E11  D11  E12  D12  E13

R1 (CR )  P(CR ) P( E11 CR ) P( D11 ) P( E12 CR , E11 , D11 ) P( D12 )

(7)

P( E13 CR , E11 , D11 , E12 , D12 ) C1

For path 2: CR  E11  D11  E12  D12  E13
R2 (CR )  P(CR ) P( E11 CR ) P( D11 ) P( E12 CR , E11 , D11 ) P( D12 )
P( E13 CR , E11 , D11 , E12 , D12 ) C2

(8)
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For path 3: CR  E11  D11  E12  E13
R3 (CR )  P(CR ) P( E11 CR ) P( D11 ) P( E13 CR , E11 , D11 )C3

(9)

For path 4: CR  E21  D21  E22  E23

R4 (CR )  P(CR ) P( E21 CR ) P( D21 ) P( E23 CR , E21, D21 )C4

(10)

For path 5: CR  E21  D21  E22  D22  E23
R5 (CR )  P(CR ) P( E21 CR ) P( D21 ) P( E22 CR , E21 , D21 ) P( D22 )

(11)

P( E23 CR , E21 , D21 , E22 , D22 ) C5

For path 6: CR  E21  D21  E22  D22  E23

R6 (CR )  P(CR ) P( E21 CR ) P( D21 ) P( E22 CR , E21 , D21 ) P( D22 )
(12)

P( E23 CR , E21 , D21 , E22 , D22 ) C6

The total risk of root cause is given by

R(CR )  R1 (CR )  R2 (CR )  R3 (CR )  R4 (CR )  R5 (CR )  R6 (CR )

(13)

In Equation (7), R1 (CR ) means the risk of root cause for the first chain. P(CR )
means the occurrence probability of root cause, P( E11 CR ) means the conditional
probability of effect E11 given the occurrence of root cause CR . Moreover, since
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detection is also considered when constructing the cause-effect chain structure, P( D11 )
in the equation means the probability of successful detection. The other elements in the
equations can be explained in a similar way.
Equations (7) through (12) calculate the risk of root cause in each path. Equation
(13) adds them together to calculate the total risk in terms of expected cost.
In next section, a simple example will be given to demonstrate the new FMEA
methodology.

3.4. AN EXAMPLE FOR DEMONSTRATION
In Section 2.3, an example was used to show the difference between a failure
scenario and a failure mode, the same example is adopted here to demonstrate how the
new method is applied to evaluate the risk of root cause.
All of the failure scenarios initiated by a root cause are shown in Figure 2.2 in
Section 2. Based upon the failure scenarios, a cause-effect chain structure is constructed
as shown in Figure 3.2.
In the structure, oil leak is the root cause CR , and the purpose of analysis is to
find the total risk of CR in terms of expected cost. As seen from the structure, “Oil leak”
as a root cause has two immediate effects, “Warning lights on” and “No warning lights”,
and each of them serves as a cause in their own chains.

Signal detected

Operation ceased

Warning lights on

Signal undetected

Oil leak

No warning lights

Operation continues

Operation continues

Engine malfunction

Engine malfunction

Figure 3.2. An Example of Cause-Effect Chain Structures [27]
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If warning lights turn on, and the signal is detected, then the end effect will be
“Operation ceased”, and this means that the driver will send the car to be examined.
On the other hand, if the signal is not detected, the driver will continue driving
without noticing the oil leak, and this leads to the end effect “Engine malfunction”.
Besides these two failure scenarios, there is another possibility that warning lights
never turn on after oil leak. If this happens, the driver will also continue driving without
noticing oil leak in the engine, and so the end effect in this failure scenario is “Engine
malfunction” too.
The simplified structure after substituting symbols into Figure 3.2 is shown below
in Figure 3.3.

Figure 3.3. Simplified Structure after Substituting Symbols into Figure 3.2
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In this case, for a root cause “Oil leak”, there exist three failure scenarios, in
another word, three chains. To evaluate the risk, the risk of root cause in each chain
should be analyzed separately first. Then add all the risk together in order to acquire the
total risk of root cause for the whole structure. So the next step after the construction of
such a structure will be collecting as much useful information from historical data as
possible. Once the information about the occurrence probability of each element in the
structure above and failure cost are both acquired, the risk of “Oil leak” in terms of cost
can be calculated.
The equations used to calculate the risks are displayed below.
For path 1: CR  E11  D11  E12

R1 (CR )  P(CR ) P( E11 CR ) P( D11 ) P( E12 CR , E11, D11 )C1

(14)

For path 2: CR  E11  D11  E12  E13
R2 (CR )  P(CR ) P( E11 CR ) P( D11 ) P( E12 CR , E11 , D11 ) P( E13 CR , E11 , D11 , E12 ) C2

(15)

For path 3: CR  E21  E22  E23

R3 (CR )  P(CR ) P( E21 CR ) P( E22 CR , E21 ) P( E23 CR , E21, E22 ) C3

(16)

The total expected cost of root cause is given by

R(CR )  R1 (CR )  R2 (CR )  R3 (CR )

(17)
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Now that all the equations used for calculating risks are obtained, the next step is
collecting information on all of the elements in the equations, for example, the
occurrence probability of root cause P(CR ) .
The information is provided in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3. The values may change
for other cases, since the information can vary significantly under different circumstances,
for example, age of the car, regular maintenance history of the car, and so on.

Table 3.2. Probability Values

P(CR )

0.1

P( D11 )

0.95

P( D11 )

0.05

P( E11 CR )

0.97

P( E22 CR , E21 )

0.99

P( E21 CR )

0.03

P( E23 CR , E21 , E22 )

0.98

P( E12 CR , E11 , D11 )

P( E12 CR , E11 , D11 )

P( E13 CR , E11 , D11 , E12 )

0.99
0.94
0.99

Table 3.3. Failure Costs (in Dollars)

C1

500

C2

3000

C3

3000
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With the information provided by Table 3.2 and Table 3.3, the risk of root cause
for each path can be calculated as follows.

R1 (CR )  0.1 0.97  0.95  0.99  500  $45.61425

(18)

R2 (CR )  0.1 0.97  0.05  0.94  0.99  3000  $13.54023

(19)

R3 (CR )  0.1 0.03  0.99  0.98  3000  $8.7318

(20)

The total expected cost of root cause is then given by

R(CR )  45.61425  13.54023  8.7318  $67.88628

(21)

The total expected cost of root cause R(CR ) is about 68 dollars.
In the next section, the new FMEA method will be applied to the turbine blades of
the aforementioned hydrokinetic system. The expected costs of two root causes are
evaluated and compared to each other so that the root cause with higher expected cost can
be identified and corrective actions are taken to reduce the expected cost.
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4. APPLICATION

In Section 3, a new FMEA approach was introduced. This approach uses the
expected cost to evaluate the risk of root causes. In order to facilitate the process of risk
analysis, a cause-effect chain structure which is based on failure scenarios is employed
too. Failure scenarios can include all possible failures initiated by the same root cause,
and this makes the result of the risk analysis more reliable and accurate. After
constructing such a structure, information such as probabilities of root causes, conditional
probabilities of intermediate effects and failure costs is collected from historical data and
other sources. Then the risk of the root cause in terms of expected cost can be calculated
easily.
The objective of this research task is to evaluate and apply the new FMEA
method to the hydrokinetic turbine design. The system is still under development, data
are not sufficient. But we still conduct the application using historical data and other
sources.
Wind turbine and hydrokinetic turbine are quite similar to each other from both
design and operation point of view, and thousands of wind turbines are in service right
now, and data from wind turbines can serve as a source for the risk analysis on
hydrokinetic turbines. However, the operation environment of hydrokinetic turbines is
significantly different from that of wind turbines, and the data should be used selectively.
At the meantime, data from hydrokinetic turbines that are deployed all over the world are
collected as well when applying the new approach to the aforementioned hydrokinetic
turbines.
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In this section, details on how the new approach is applied to the hydrokinetic
turbine system will be discussed. Since a turbine blade is the most critical component in
the system, in this case study, we applied the new method to its design. Root causes and
intermediate effects of turbine blades are examined to make sure all possible failure
scenarios are considered.

4.1. FAILURE SCENARIOS OF TURBINE BLADES
Root causes that might happen when the turbine is in operation are considered and
all the possible failure scenarios that are initiated by the root causes are shown in
Table 4.1.
As can be observed from the first column in the table, there are in total six root
causes. Each of them initiates a cause-effect chain structure. The second root cause,
“Corrosive environment”, is used to demonstrate how to conduct the risk analysis. This
root cause results in five different failure scenarios. Each scenario is analyzed separately,
and then the results are aggregated together to obtain the total risk of this root cause.

4.2. CONSTRUCTING CAUSE-EFFECT CHAIN STRUCTURES
As discussed in Section 3, such a structure is composed of several cause-effect
chains which are connected at the beginning by the same root cause, and each chain
represents a failure scenario that is initiated by the root cause.

Table 4.1. Failure Scenarios of Hydrokinetic Turbine Blades
Tremendous change in
flow velocity
(0.1-0.2)

Overspeed rotation
of blades
(07-0.8)

Varying loads on blade
(0.95)

E121
Local stress concentration
(0.5-0.7)

CR
Corrosive environment
(0.6-0.8)

Impact on blades
(0.01-0.02)
Debris piling on
blades
(0.4-0.6)
Impact on blades
(0.7-0.8)

E122
Strength reduction
(0.8-0.9)

D121
Undetected
(0.01-0.05)
D122
Detected
(0.95-0.99)
D122
Undetected
(0.01-0.05)

System shutdown
Fatigue(0.6-0.7)

E131
System shutdown

E131
Fatigue
(0.6-0.7)

E141
Blade fracture
(0.8-0.9)

E132
System shutdown

E132
Fatigue
(0.6-0.7)

E123
Propagated cracks(0.4-0.5)

E133
Blade fracture(0.5-0.6)

Small deformation
(0.5-0.1)

Reduced efficiency
(0.5-0.7)

Increasing loads on system
(0.5-0.7)

System shutdown
(0.6-0.8)

Blade fracture
(0.6-0.8)

Blade fracture
(0.8-0.9)

E142
Blade fracture
(0.8-0.9)
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Presence of trivial debris
(0.5-0.6)
Presence of moderate
debris
(0.1-0.2)
Presence of huge debris
(0.01-0.02)

E11
Blade corrosion
(0.65)

Detected
(0.95-0.99)
Undetected
(0.01-0.05)
D121
Detected
(0.95-0.99)
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Since one root cause corresponds to one cause-effect chain structure, so in order
to construct as many structures as possible, we need to figure out all the possible root
causes first.
The cause-effect chain structure was constructed as shown in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1. A Cause-Effect Chain Structure of Hydrokinetic Turbine Blades
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It is shown in the structure that root cause CR has only one immediate effect E11 ,
which is followed by three different subsequent effects E121 , E122 , and E123 . Then E121
goes under detection. D121 means successful detection of E121 so that end effect E131
happens. D121 means unsuccessful detection of E121 so that E131 happens, which is
followed by an end effect E141 . Similarly, E122 goes under detection too and leads to
two different end effects E132 and E142 . Since there is no detection technique for effect

E123 , the occurrence of E123 directly leads to end effect E133 .
As mentioned before, all of the end effects will be evaluated in terms of cost, and
so failure costs C1 , C2 , C3 , C4 and C5 are used to evaluate end effects E131 , E141 ,

E132 , E142 and E133 , respectively.
Equation (22) through Equation (26) shown below calculate the risk of root cause
for each chain.
For path 1: CR  E11  E121  D121  E131
R1 (CR )  P(CR ) P( E11 CR ) P( E121 CR , E11 ) P( D121 )
P( E131 CR , E11 , E121 , D121 ) C1

(22)

For path 2: CR  E11  E121  D121  E131  E141
R2 (CR )  P(CR ) P( E11 CR ) P( E121 CR , E11 ) P( D121 ) P( E131 CR , E11 , E121 , D121 )
P( E141 CR , E11 , E121 , D121 , E131 )C2

(23)
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For path 3: CR  E11  E122  D122  E132
R3 (CR )  P(CR ) P( E11 CR ) P( E122 CR , E11 ) P( D122 )

(24)

P( E132 CR , E11 , E122 , D122 ) C3

For path 4: CR  E11  E122  D122  E132  E142
R4 (CR )  P(CR ) P( E11 CR ) P( E122 CR , E11 ) P( D122 ) P( E132 CR , E11 , E122 , D122 )

(25)

P( E142 CR , E11 , E122 , D122 , E132 )C4

For path 5: CR  E11  E123  E133

R5 (CR )  P(CR ) P( E11 CR ) P( E123 CR , E11 ) P( E133 CR , E11, E123 ) C5

(26)

Equation (27) aggregates the results and acquires the total risk of root cause. The
total expected cost of root cause is then given by

R(CR )  R1 (CR )  R2 (CR )  R3 (CR )  R4 (CR )  R5 (CR )

As can be observed from the equations, in order to obtain the total risk of root
cause CR , information such as probabilities and failure costs should be collected.

(27)
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4.3. COLLECTING INFORMATION ON THE HYDROKINETIC TURBINE
Now the cause-effect chain structure is constructed, and how the risk is calculated
is known as well. The next step is to collect information for each element in Equation (22)
through Equation (26).
4.3.1. Probabilities of Failures. To obtain the probabilities of failures,
information such as occurrence probabilities of root causes , conditional probabilities of
intermediate effects, and probabilities of successful or unsuccessful detection should be
estimated first.
The probability values involved in the equations above are all shown in Table 4.2.
As mentioned before, since information on hydrokinetic turbines is quite limited,
historical data on wind turbines are adopted too, which will inevitably introduce more
uncertainties to the probability values assigned to root causes and intermediate effects. So
interval probabilities are employed here. For example, the occurrence probability of root
cause “Tremendous change in flow rate and direction” which is the first cell in the first
column of Table 4.1 is assigned to be “[0.1-0.2]”, because different rivers or streams have
different current flow situations, even within the same river, the flow situation changes
too.
Interval probabilities can accommodate uncertainties due to insufficient data.
When more data are available, these intervals can be modified to be more accurate so that
the results are more accurate and reliable. Since some of the probabilities are in the form
of intervals, it can be foreseen that expected costs will be in the form of intervals too.
This means that the expected cost obtained by the new method can accommodate
uncertainties too and allow for further modifications.
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Table 4.2. Probability Values

P(CR )

0.6-0.8

P( D122 )

0.95-0.99

P( E11 CR )

0.65

P( D122 )

0.01-0.05

P( E121 CR , E11 )

0.5-0.7

P( E131 CR , E11 , E121 , D121 )

0.6-0.7

P( E122 CR , E11 )

0.8-0.9

P( E141 CR , E11 , E121 , D121 , E131 )

0.8-0.9

P( E123 CR , E11 )

0.4-0.5

P( E132 CR , E11 , E122 , D122 )

0.6-0.7

P( D121 )

0.95-0.99

P( E142 CR , E11 , E122 , D122 , E132 )

0.8-0.9

P( D121 )

0.01-0.05

P( E133 CR , E11 , E123 )

0.5-0.6

4.3.2. Costs of Failures. Once the probabilities of failures are available, the next
step is to find the cost of failures.
Time is a factor to determine the cost of failure. In order to obtain the cost of
failures, detection time Tdt , fixing time T f and delay time Tdl should be acquired first.
Detection time means the time to realize and identify a certain type of failure that
has occurred and diagnose the exact location and its root cause. Fixing time is the time to
fix each individual component. Delay time is the time incurred for on-value activities
such as waiting for response from technicians. The unit for all the time information is in
hours.
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The failure cost mainly includes three components: labor cost Cl , material cost

Cm and opportunity cost Co . The meanings of labor cost and material cost are explicit
by their names. The opportunity cost is the cost that incurs when a failure inhibits the
main function of the system and prevents any value creation.
The labor cost can be derived with the aforementioned time information using the
following equation:
Cl  (Tdt  Tf  Tdl )  Rl  N

(28)

where Rl means labor rate, and N represents the number of operators that are assigned
to fix problems.
The material cost can be obtained using the following equation:
Cm  C p  N p

(29)

where C p means the cost of part, and N p represents the number of parts that need to be
replaced.
The opportunity cost is calculated using the following equation:
Co  (Tdt  Tf  Tdl )  Ro

where Ro means hourly opportunity cost.
The labor cost and opportunity cost are dependent on time and once the time
information is obtained through historical data, they can be estimated easily.

(30)
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After examining the cause-effect chain structure in Figure 4.1, we noticed that
there are two different types of failures, “Blade fracture” and “System shutdown”.
For the first failure, “Blade fracture”, the cost will be the summation of labor cost,
material cost and opportunity cost. However, for the second failure, “System shutdown”,
the cost will be the summation of labor cost and opportunity cost only, because in this
case blades do not need to be replaced yet. And it can also be foreseen that the labor cost
and opportunity cost involved in the second failure will be less than that involved in the
first one, because the time of maintenance after system shutdown will be less than the
time of replacing fractured blades.
Table 4.3 shows the comparison of the time loss between the two different
failures.

Table 4.3. Loss Time of the Two Failures (in Hours)
Blades fracture

System shutdown

Detection time

5

1

Fixing time

4

2

Delay time

4

2

Total time

13

5
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The labor rate in this analysis is assumed to be $50 per hour. Suppose two
operators are assigned to fix problems after either of the two failures happens. The labor
cost for either of the two failures can be calculated with Equation (28).
From Equation (29) it can be seen that the material cost is independent of time,
and it is only related to the cost of parts to be replaced and the quantity of the parts. Since
this case study is focused upon turbine blades of the hydrokinetic system, the two failures
are only related to turbine blades too. The manufacturing cost of the turbine blades is
about $2500.
The hourly opportunity cost is composed of the labor rate as well as the loss of
electrical power that is generated from the hydrokinetic system per hour, considering the
system will be shut down when failure happens. The turbine blades used for this case
study are very small in size, and the length of blade is about 0.3 m. The power generated
by the system is relatively small, and so the failure-resulted loss of electric power may be
neglected.
After conducting sufficient research on other turbines that have been deployed, it
is estimated that the hourly opportunity cost for this hydrokinetic system is about $500,
which is relatively low because of the small size of the system. According to
Equation (30), the opportunity cost when either of two failures happens can then
be calculated.
The comparison of the costs between the two different failures is shown in
Table 4.4.
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Table 4.4. Costs of the Two Failures (in Dollars)
Blade fracture

System shutdown

Labor cost

1300

500

Material cost

2500

100

Opportunity cost

6500

2500

Total cost

10300

3100

It should be pointed out that the hydrokinetic system in this case study is much
smaller compared to those tested in reality, so the failure costs for this system can be
significantly magnified when the system is scaled up. For example, if the blades are
lengthened and widened, the material cost will be higher when failure happens. The
opportunity cost will be higher too because the shutdown of a larger system means
increased loss of electrical power that should have been generated.

4.4. CALCULATING RISK IN TERMS OF EXPECTED COST
Now that the probability values are obtained and shown in Table 4.2, and the
failure costs are listed in Table 4.4. Plugging the values in the two tables into
Equation (22) through Equation (26) will yield the risk of root cause for each path.
Then Equation (27) adds all the risks together and yields the total risk of root cause

R(CR ) .
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As mentioned before, since some of the probability values are intervals, the total
risk, which is in terms of expected cost, will be an interval too. So the lower bound and
upper bound need be found, separately.
The lower bound for each path is calculated by the following Equation (31)
through Equation (35).

R1 (CR )l  0.6  0.65  0.5  0.95  3100  $547.275

(31)

R2 (CR )l  0.6  0.5  0.6  0.01 0.6  0.8 10300  $8.8992

(32)

R3 (CR )l  0.6  0.65  0.8  0.95  3100  $918.84

(33)

R4 (CR )l  0.6  0.65  0.8  0.01 0.6  0.8 10300  $15.42528

(34)

R5 (CR )l  0.6  0.65  0.4  0.5  3100  $241.8

(35)

The lower bound of the total expected cost of root cause is given by

R(CR )l  R1 (CR )l  R2 (CR )l  R3 (CR )l  R4 (CR )l  R5 (CR )l
 547.275  8.8992  918.84  15.42528  241.8

(36)

 $1732.23948

The upper bound for each path is calculated by the following Equation (37)
through Equation (41).

R1 (CR )u  0.8  0.65  0.7  0.99  3100  $1117.116

(37)

R2 (CR )u  0.8  0.65  0.7  0.05  0.7  0.9 10300  $118.0998

(38)
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R3 (CR )u  0.8  0.65  0.9  0.99  3100  $1436.292

(39)

R4 (CR )u  0.8  0.65  0.9  0.05  0.7  0.9 10300  $151.8426

(40)

R5 (CR )u  0.8  0.65  0.5  0.6  3100  $483.6

(41)

The upper bound of the total expected cost of root cause is given by

R(CR )u  R1 (CR )u  R2 (CR )u  R3 (CR )u  R4 (CR )u  R5 (CR )u
 1117.116  118.0998  1436.292  151.8426  483.6

(42)

 $3306.9504

The expected cost of root cause R(CR ) is given by

$1732  R(CR )  $3307

(43)

4.5. ANOTHER CASE STUDY
For the purpose of comparing risks of different root causes, the first root cause in
Table 4.1, “Tremendous change in flow velocity and direction” was used to conduct
another case study. The cause-effect chain structure is shown in Figure 4.2.
The risk of CR in each path is calculated by the following equations.
For path 1: CR  E11  E12  D12  E13
R1 (CR )  P(CR ) P( E11 CR ) P( E12 CR , E11 ) P( D12 ) P( E13 CR , E11 , E12 , D12 )C1

For path 2: CR  E11  E12  D12  E13  E14

(44)

62

R2 (CR )  P(CR ) P( E11 CR ) P( E12 CR , E11 ) P( D12 ) P( E13 CR , E11 , E12 , D12 )
(45)

P( E14 CR , E11 , E12 D12 , E13 )C2

Figure 4.2. Another Cause-Effect Chain Structure of Hydrokinetic Turbine Blades

Next, information is collected and shown in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 below.

Table 4.5. Probability Values
P( D12 )

P(CR )

0.1-0.2

P( E11 CR )

0.7-0.8

P( E12 CR , E11 )

0.95

P( D12 )

0.95-0.99

P( E13 CR , E11 , E12 , D12 )
P( E14 CR , E11 , E12 D12 , E13 )

0.01-0.05
0.6-0.7
0.8-0.9
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Table 4.6. Loss Time of the Two Failures (in Hours)
System shutdown
Blade fracture
Detection time

3

5

Fixing time

2

4

Delay time

4

4

Total time

9

13

As discussed in Section 4.4, the labor rate is estimated to be $50 per hour, the
hourly opportunity cost is about $500, and the material cost for the turbine blades is
$2500. With Equations (23), (24) and (25), and Table 4.6, the costs of the two failures are
calculated and shown in Table 4.7.

Table 4.7. Costs of the Two Failures (in Dollars)
System shutdown
Blade fracture
Labor cost

900

1300

Material cost

200

2500

Opportunity cost

4500

6500

Total failure cost

5600

10300
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The probability values are shown in Table 4.5 and the failure costs are shown in
Table 4.7. Plugging these values into Equation (44) and (45) yields the risk of root cause
for each path.
Since only the two paths are initiated by root cause CR , the risk of CR is
obtained by adding the results of Equation (44) and Equation (45) together.

R(CR )  R1 (CR )  R2 (CR )

(46)

The lower bound of the expected cost for each path is calculated by Equation (47)
and Equation (48).

R1 (CR )l  0.1 0.7  0.95  0.95  5600  $353.78

(47)

R2 (CR )l  0.1 0.7  0.95  0.01 0.6  0.8 10300  $32.8776

(48)

The lower bound of the total expected cost of root cause is given by

R(CR )l  R1 (CR )l  R2 (CR )l  353.78  32.8776  $386.6576

(49)

The upper bound of the expected cost for each path is calculated by Equation (50)
and Equation (51).

R1 (CR )u  0.2  0.8  0.95  0.99  5600  $842.688

(50)

R2 (CR )u  0.2  0.8  0.95  0.05  0.7  0.9 10300  $49.3164

(51)

The upper bound of the total expected cost of root cause is given by
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R(CR )u  R1 (CR )u  R2 (CR )u  842.688  49.3164  $892.0044

(52)

The total expected cost of the root cause R(CR ) is given by

$387  R(CR )  $892

(53)

4.6. COMPARISON OF RISKS BETWEEN TWO CASE STUDIES
The comparison of interval risks between the two root causes are shown in
Table 4.8.

Table 4.8. Comparison of Interval Risks (in Dollars)

CR

R(CR )l

R(CR )u

Corrosive environment

1732

3307

Tremendous change in flow velocity

387

892

It is quite obvious that the first root cause has higher risk, because both the lower
bound and upper bound of the first root cause are higher than those of the second one.
And the two ranges have no intersection in between, which makes the comparison
straightforward. The first root cause “Corrosive environment” has higher risk and
corrective actions should be taken with priority to reduce the risk.
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However, for other cases, when risks are compared with each other, it is very
likely that an intersection exists between two risk intervals. If this happens, comparison is
not straightforward anymore. Different approaches on decision making under interval
probabilities have been made. The approaches can be found in [48-51]. However, in this
paper, two general approaches are proposed to address this issue. One is to directly
compare the average value of the two intervals. The other one is the worst case approach,
which only compares the upper bound of the two intervals.
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

In the traditional FMEA method, risk is evaluated by risk priority number (RPN),
which is the product of O (occurrence), S (severity), and D (detection). Failure modes
with higher RPN values are considered having higher risks. Corrective actions are then
taken to reduce the RPN values. This method has been implemented in industry since last
century. However, it has the following drawbacks:


The subjectivity in RPNs is considerably high.



The comparison of RPNs between products or processes is difficult.



The accuracy and reliability of the results provided by the traditional FMEA are
questionable.
Many methods have been developed for improving FMEA. The methodology

proposed in this work employs the expected cost as the tool to evaluate risks so that the
subjectivity in risk results can be minimized and comparison of risks is facilitated.
Moreover, the new method uses the cause-effect chain structure to represent failure
scenarios given a root cause so that more possible end effects are under consideration,
and the results become more accurate and reliable.

5.1. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, a modified FMEA approach is proposed and demonstrated. It is
applied to the hydrokinetic system being developed at Missouri S&T to evaluate the risks
of root causes that might incur failures to turbine blades of the system. This new
approach proved its advantages over the traditional way in the following aspects:
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First, the new method employs cause-effect chain structures which are
constructed based upon failure scenarios and the Bayesian network. The
structures overcome the following drawback of the traditional FMEA: only the
most serious end effects are taken into account to calculate the RPN. However,
this is not the case in reality, because several different end effects are all possible
to occur even if there is only one root cause. The implementation of failure
scenarios and Bayesian network can take many possible end effects into
consideration, and in a cause-effect chain structure, all possibilities from a root
cause are included. This makes the results of risk analysis more accurate and
reliable.



Second, RPN as the key element in the traditional FMEA method has always been
most criticized. When conducting FMEA, assigning precise ratings for O
(occurrence), S (severity), and D (detection) is difficult, especially when historical
data are not available. The RPNs are considered subjective because sometimes the
experience of the team members is the only source of information. However, the
new method does not employ RPN as the tool to evaluate risk; instead, occurrence
and severity ratings are substituted by the expected cost, which is adopted as a
new tool to evaluate risks. In this way, not only more reasonable results can be
obtained, but also the subjectivity of the results can be reduced.



Moreover, in the new method, the detection rating is replaced by the probability
of either successful or unsuccessful detection, which is directly related to the
maturity of detection techniques implemented in applications. This makes the
results more reliable and realistic.
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Last, in the traditional FMEA, comparison of risk information represented by
RPNs is quite difficult and sometimes impossible. In this new method, risk is
evaluated by expected cost, which makes the comparison of risk information
straightforward.

5.2. FUTURE WORK
Although the new method improves the traditional FMEA, there is room for
further improvement.
In the method proposed in this paper, risk is evaluated in terms of expected cost,
which is the product of the probability of failure and failure cost. Since the information
on probabilities and costs are all obtained from historical data and sometimes appropriate
assumptions, uncertainties exist in the components of expected cost, such as detection
time, fixing time and so on. Sensitive analysis can be conducted on these components to
determine which of them has the most significant influence on the risk results. Then the
accuracy and reliability of the results can be improved efficiently by reducing uncertainty
in this component.
Hydrokinetic technologies are still in the developmental phase, and not many
turbines have been built and deployed for commercial use, so data for hydrokinetic
turbines are very limited by far. In the application of the proposed method to the
hydrokinetic turbine, interval probabilities are used to accommodate uncertainties due to
insufficient data. However, the intervals can be modified to represent the real situation
more precisely when more hydrokinetic systems are deployed in rivers or oceans. Risks
with higher accuracy and reliability can be obtained.
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Moreover, when comparing the two interval risks in Section 4, it involves the
technique of decision making under interval probabilities. Although two approaches are
made to address this issue, a more reliable method needs to be conceived.
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